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CAPITAL MARKETS ISSUES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE A PANEL DISCUSSION
MODERATOR: JOHN E. ROGERS, ESQ.PANELISTS: LIC. FRANCISCO CARRILLO GAMBOA, TERRENCE A.
EVERETT, ESQ., DAVID HUNTINGTON, ESQ., LIC. MIGUEL JAUREGUI
ROJAS, MIKE LUBRANO, ESQ., LIC. JAMES E. RITCH, JR.
ROGERS: One of the issues that comes to mind when talking about the
potential disenfranchisement of holders of ADRs' is how that actually functions in
practice. If I have invested in the Mexican company, I have an ADR, and I want to
participate and attend a shareholders meeting, how do I go about doing that? As a
practical matter, how do I convert my ADR into a share that entitles me to attend
the shareholders meeting, participate, and hear directly from management what is
going on? As we know, the published agendas for shareholders meetings are fairly
bare bones. The agendas do not disclose much about what may actually be
discussed at the meetings. I wonder if David and James could tell us how an ADR
holder might become able to actually physically attend a shareholders meeting in
Mexico.
HUNTINGTON: Typically, what the ADR holder has is an agreement with the
depository, which is a U.S. commercial bank, Bank of New York or Morgan
Guarantee Trust. The depository agreement can say a variety of things. There is
actually a range of different formulations on this particular topic. One thing it can
say, more often than not, is that the depository, because it holds the shares through
a custodian in Mexico, will have notice of shareholder's meetings and will provide
notice to the ADR holders. Also, the ADR holders have the ability to come in and
tell the depository how they want the depository to vote on their behalf. Another
thing that is typical in these agreements is a provision as to what happens in the
event that the holder does not respond. In such a case, the depository can either
give a proxy to management or not vote the shares at all.
There are also deposit agreements that don't provide rights to U.S. ADR holders,
and I think what you are getting at is that, as a practical matter, quite often ADR
holders do not end up participating. It can be quite important. For example, there
is a case involving a Chilean company that held a very important shareholder's vote.
The depository, one of the principle U.S. holders of ADRs, did not get the notice
in time and came in one day after the deadline. The depository still would have had
the chance to make a vote in Chile, but because they were worried about their
liability and the process, they did not end up voting. Unfortunately, that block of
shares would have changed the outcome of the decision.
However, I do not think this is actually something that the Mexican companies
are particularly worried about. As mentioned before, many companies listed in
New York are still controlled by Mexican controlling shareholders. So, in many of
these cases, these types of votes do not matter very much. Even where they do
matter, the disenfranchisement of U.S. holders is not viewed as something that the
issuer is going to worry about too much.

* A summary of the background of each of the participants in this panel follows on the last page of the
panel discussion.
1. American Depository Receipts.
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ROGERS: Let us suppose, then, that an ADR holder does want to participate
and gives instructions to the depository to have a proxy issued to that shareholder.
What would happen then?
HUNTINGTON: That is a bit of an unusual situation and I have not heard of
such a situation.
JAUREGUI: If for any reason the shareholder wants to participate in a meeting,
how should we go about it? This is something that in practice that one seldom sees.
Usually, one would go through the depository to exercise any voting rights.
HUNTINGTON: Speaking technically, it depends on the timing. However, the
ADR holder could convert the ADR into shares and then attend the shareholders'
meeting.
2
LUBRANO: I think David was talking about a situation involving Templeton
in Chile. He actually was very generous in describing why the custodian of the
depository did not respond in time. In fact, in the end, they had to call a second
vote because of a great deal of pressure. When Mr. Mark Mobius3 did vote the
shares, the outcome was reversed.
Nevertheless, as we have already discussed in this forum, there is an investor task
force group that includes CalPERS4 and TIAA-CREF5 . They are going to start
voting their ADRs because they are under pressure from their shareholders, their
own governance, to treat their ADRs just like they treat other investments, such as
their U.S. and European investments. It becomes a large issue when you have a
major corporate event, such as a merger or the sale of a principle asset. Those are
becoming more common in the region; such was the issue in the Chilean case.
There, they required a super-majority that the family-owned or group-controlled
companies may not have. Most of the companies, the institutional investors, like
Templeton, hold both underlying and ADRs so they can just combine them. They
have somebody there. The reasons for holding the local shares vary from time to
time. It is a question of liquidity. They are playing the local markets as well. They
are trying to become more active, regardless of what the families that own the
companies think.
JAUREGUI: When you are talking about voting in Mexico, you have to think
of the evolution of voting in the scenario of shareholders meetings or in debt equity
situations. That is, basically, that the Mexican companies were accustomed to
receive financing from banks. So, we had a few people that we talked about. We
only had negative and affirmative covenants. We lived very happily and, if we went
sour, we would just talk to a few. Then, we decided that we would go into the
public market and get involved in the ADR business that we are discussing right
now, the result of which has been that you basically have absent voters.
However, soon we saw an evolution in the Mexico-related securities markets that
stemmed especially from the holders. The bondholders are now changing the
manner in which you are going to be doing business with Mexico. They are voting,
they are very preoccupied, they are establishing committees, they are trying to get
into governance, and they are trying to impede things from divesting. This is a
2.
3.
4.
5.

Franklin Templeton is an international investment fund.
Franklin Templeton's "Emerging Markets" president.
California Public Employees Retirement System.
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund.
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feature that is in transition, which we are seeing now because of the very extensive
debt securities that we have placed in the market. You can principally see it in the
infrastructure of companies and, therefore, you see an evolution towards a more
active participation of purchasers and intermediaries in helping to make the
purchase.
CARRILLO: I would like to add a couple of things. First, I understand that it
is usually problematic for ADR holders to participate in capital increases. Mexican
corporate law allows you the preferential right to participate and maintain your
percentage ownership in a capital increase. In comparison, I understand that U.S.
securities law generates a whole bunch of issues in terms of general registration and
solicitation for those purposes. So, generally, for the Mexican, in prospectus of
Mexican issue and register offerings especially, the actual exercise of that right by
the ADR holders may be difficult to do.
A second thing that I wanted to comment on deals with what Miguel was
discussing. That is, as a result of the recent distress of many Mexican companies
that have publicly traded debt and equity securities mostly in the debt area, the
committees of bondholders have become very active. Many funds have bought a
lot of distress bonds making it another very important player in restructuring, in the
monitoring of compliance of covenants, and in the equity area when there is talk
about possible bankruptcy, suspension of payments, etcetera. More and more, we
are seeing the aggregation of foreign shareholders monitoring their investment,
which was not very common before the distress.
ROGERS: We have been talking mostly about equity securities. However,
Mike, with respect to debt securities, could you say something about how some of
these principles of corporate governance might be applied to the debt security
context?
LUBRANO: We are mostly debt holders at IFC and only a minority of our
assets are in equity. That sometimes creates an issue when we are both debt and
equity holders in the company and appoint a director to the board. It may not
always be clear whom he is looking out for: the shareholders or the larger portion
of money that we hold of the debt. Even in the United States that can be a serious
problem and present a potential conflict of interest. The directors are supposed to
be responsible to the company when, in fact, they represent the people who
appointed them. So those are very complicated issues. What we focus on in the
work of a Global Corporate Governance Forum is real transparency for the debt
holders. Of course, they have their own private structure of the indenture and the
bondholders meeting, but we focus mostly on the issue of transparency. I did not
get a chance to mention this, but some of the new markets that are being set up for
equities have mandatory arbitration of disputes between shareholders and the
company. This is a good thing because the legal process of enforcement is much
too complicated and time consuming. It is much harder to transfer that into the debt
side where you are still stuck with courts.
ROGERS: With respect to arbitration, Francisco was talking about the
documentation used in some of these private equity transactions; many of the
documents are governed by New York law, New York jurisdiction or subject to
arbitration. He also talked about the interplay between the shareholders agreement
and the bylaws of the Mexican company. I recently saw a set of proposed bylaws
of a Mexican company that had an arbitration clause in the bylaws. Francisco,
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would you comment on how the arbitration clause works in the context of Mexican
bylaws? Certainly, one would assume that it works in a shareholders agreement or
a subscription or share purchase agreement.
CARRILLO: Yes, that is a very interesting question. In connection with the
bylaws of the company, the bylaws set forth the basic agreement between the
shareholders. In my opinion, the bylaws is a document that has to be subject,
basically, to the Mexican corporate law, and also to Mexican courts because that is
where you enforce the basic rights of shareholders as commercial shareholders. If
you submit it to arbitration, there is the possibility that a minority shareholder could
challenge the validity of the arbitration clause because they can invoke the principle
that they do not have access to the judicial remedies in order to enforce their
corporate rights through the Mexican legal forum.
ROGERS: There is the theory that the bylaws are simply a contract between
investors and, therefore, the investors can agree to whatever terms they wish.
CARRILLO: Yes, but the bylaws are the principle. From the bylaws you have
concepts like liability, accountability of directors, liability of directors, liability of
officers, and that is something that you would normally have to bring legal actions
against in order to enforce those claims, even though it is a contract. Furthermore,
the law provides that shareholders' rights must be enforced through the Mexican
court system, not through arbitration. So, although you can provide an arbitration
clause in the bylaws, I question that such a clause would be enforceable.
JAUREGUI: I agree with Francisco. I think that, per se, you can include an
arbitration clause in your charter and bylaws, but it will only work to the extent that
public policy allows it. Objective law applicable to the case deals with court
procedures rather than arbitration procedures, like responsibility actions against
general directors, and CEOs.
ROGERS: We were also talking about the extent to which the Mexican Bolsa
may disappear and the extent to which investors and issuers will rely much more on
the money center markets. There has been some talk about the possibility of an
interim step. That is, the Bolsa merging with one or more other stock markets.
Does anyone have anything to tell us about that?
LUBRANO: All I can add is that, throughout the region, there are the
beginnings of efforts to merge exchanges. Trading on the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange has dropped off dramatically. All the stock exchanges in Brazil were
closed this past year except for the Slo Paulo Stock Exchange, the Bovespa. So,
there have been talks of alliances between OECD and the exchanges throughout the
region because otherwise the volume is not there to support the staff.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am aware that the Mexican stock exchange is
having discussions with a number of other exchanges to try and figure out whether
a merger would make sense. However, this is within the larger topic of the
modernization and the real future of the Mexican stock exchange.
LUBRANO: One issue that we are presented with in looking at the region's
exchanges and trading systems is that there are restrictions on the principle
investors investing in the other Latin countries. For example, if you had a Latin
American medium-size exchange, which might not be a bad idea, the analysts could
be regional and could cover the small and medium-sized companies. You would
find that the pension funds would be the biggest investors, but that Peruvians would
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not be able to invest in Bolivian securities, nor Mexicans invest in Argentine
securities. That would be a major obstacle.
JAUREGUI: Also, the issue of Internet securities dealings may be the de facto
consolidation of the stock market globally. They are principally driven by the
central money markets of the world and are all coming together through broker
dealers and through portals of broker dealers and other related financial institutions
offering securities worldwide. The effect of this could basically reduce or eliminate
many of the costs.
ROGERS: I think one of the theories behind Star Media, based in New York,
was that because it had a regional center it could focus on the entire region.
However, I do not think that that model is working out as well as people had
envisioned, but I do think there may be a turn away from that to focus on specific
e-commerce situations in individual countries.
HUNTINGTON: I wanted to mention one other initiative that I think is related
to this discussion, which is the concept of universal shares. I think that about a year
and a half ago, Daimler Chrysler was the first company to issue its share on the
New York Stock Exchange in the same forum that they are listed in Frankfurt and
London. The share is quoted in dollars in the United States, but it is, for all intents
and purposes, fungible with shares that are traded in Frankfurt. One of the
questions that I have been thinking about whether we are likely to move in this same
direction in either the Mexican or Latin American context. Generally, because there
are certain costs, there are costs to investors for having the ADR system. While
there are also benefits, there are by products of the system including costs and some
of the voting procedures. What you would have to do is not quite merge the stock
exchanges, but you have to get the exchanges and the clearance and settlements
system to interface. This is what happened in the German clearing system, where
they set up a link with the Depository Trust Company (DTC) so that the shares
could trade across those borders in a pretty fungible manner. I think the sense that
we have is that the first company to do this is going to have a real headache just in
figuring out how this is going to be done. No company presented with this choice
would take it. They all would choose to do ADRs because that is what everybody
else does. In my opinion, going in that direction would ultimately have beneficial
consequences for the Bolsa and the liquidity of the Bolsa.
JAUREGUI: The Mexican Securities Commission recently issued a Circular
allowing for the registration of non-Mexican securities in Mexico. It is a very
general Circular but it stili has to address the issue of linking of clearance and
settlement systems, etcetera. Or, it just may be another part of the puzzle to
establish some sort of link between markets. However, it is all part of the global
project.
ROGERS: I would like to go back to the issue of disclosure and ask our
panelists if they can point to specific issues or areas of concern that have proven to
be difficult for Mexican issuers to make disclosures about. We know we have
different standards of disclosure with respect to different types of issues, but what
are the kinds of concerns that you have seen in terms of issues, questions or areas
of activity that issuers have been reluctant to make full disclosures about? Perhaps
this would be a more appropriate question for those of you who represent issuers.
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JAUREGUI: Let us discuss a conceptual issue here. First of all, the scenarios
where you would have complications disclosing something are scenarios where you
are either on the brink of bankruptcy or in liquidity for whatever reason, and it
captures you between one and the other reporting periods. Or, perhaps you have
come into an agreement whereby the banks will be paid with the results of the sale
of the controlling interest in the company. How do you handle what you, your
employees and your advisors disclose of that? That is certainly going to be an issue
that has tripartite complications from a legal point of view. There are insider trader
issues, there are disclosure issues, and there is the famous Circular that I was
referring to. Then, by the same token, there are negative covenants, affirmative
covenants and the confidentiality clause within a restructure agreement. How is that
dealt with?
ROGERS: Actually, I was thinking about a recent case where the company had
been negotiating with a perspective investor partner, a fact that was well known to
the public. The fact that negotiations had broken down, however, was not
immediately disclosed. Was that because of reluctance to give the bad news or
were there confidentiality restrictions that were preventing it?
RITCH: It is very difficult to describe general areas of concern for disclosure
of a particular company, but I have had a couple of cases that deal with this issue.
One was a bond deal by a sugar company in Mexico that is now in financial
distress. It is a very complex industry, and we had to go into great depth - talk to
the chamber of the sugar industry, etcetera- to try to cover absolutely every risk
factor possible. This was a difficult task because, of course, the issuer thought that
the U.S. underwriters were exaggerating.
Another area of concern in another transaction involved a family company that
was about to go public. There were some disputes among family shareholders on
a second level and we had to go in. It was a due diligence matter. We identified a
couple of potential claims that could eventually, theoretically, go against the
validity of the shares being offered. There was a lot of insistence on disclosing this
appropriately. It finally was disclosed, but some Mexican companies that are
closely held are not sophisticated and fail to understand that the disclosure is for
their protection. In Mexico, part of the effort by Mexican lawyers is to make them
understand that it is not just about gossip or whatever, but it is to really help them
out and I think that that culture is starting to be understood.
HUNTINGTON: I have a couple of general comments. There are two general
areas that, in terms of basic disclosure, you must do annually and at the time of a
public offering. One is compiling the financial statements. Getting the financial
statements in good enough shape is always a problem. The other general area is a
kind of transaction with affiliates which is something that has come up in lots of
different contexts. I also have had some similar experiences where, just prior to a
restructuring or a bankruptcy, a publicly listed company was in default under
registered bonds. They were reluctant to disclose the default and their reaction was
to fix the default. It was a real task persuading them that it was in their interest to
disclose the information, and convincing them that the market would react favorably
to full disclosure and negatively to nondisclosure.
ROGERS: What about things that under U.S. rules might have to be qualified
as forward-looking statements? What is the rule in Mexico with respect to those
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kinds of projections or predictions of how the business is going to develop over
time?
RITCH: I think that there is no specific rule as is the case with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation. But it is also something that is not
looked upon favorably by the Securities Commission in Mexico. It has not really
developed as a statute, or as a specific restriction, but they review the prospectus
and when they see those sorts of statements, they ask for support. If they feel that
there are no reasonable facts to support it with, then they strike it out.
CARRILLO: In particular, in the case of financial projections, there is one
specific case in accordance with the internal rules of the Mexican Stock Exchange
that has to do with a change in the financial projections of the company. It is not
a forward-looking statement in the sense that you are not going to disclose your
projections, but if you previously disclose projections and there is a change, such
change can constitute information you must disclose. However, as Jim said, we do
not have any specific standard in the Mexican stock market.
ROGERS: Finally, one more issue before we open it up to questions. Returning
to the general issue of shareholders rights, if, for example, I bought a private
placement in the United States of an issue by a Mexican company, and something
went wrong and the shares become worthless, what would the remedies be for the
disaffected investor in the U.S.?
EVERETT: Assuming that there is an enterprise there that has any ability to
respond to a claim and damages, which, if the shares are worthless, there probably
is not such entity. However, assuming there was such entity, a U.S. investor could
bring an action in the U.S. as long as the offer and sale occurred in the U.S. Of
course, you will always have the issues of whether you will be able to enforce those
types of judgments.
There are also issues if the company does not have the capability and knowledge
to try to attack the control persons or other people who are usually down in Mexico.
They are not quite as concerned or troubled by those issues as U.S. directors would
be. So, it is a fairly difficult situation, particularly if there is just an outright fraud
because, generally, the real issue is to whether the SEC will proceed to bring an
enforcement action and try to litigate jurisdiction. This would leave you with a civil
action and there are real issues as to whether you could push for a class action or
not, depending upon the circumstances. So, it really is a buyer beware situation.
If you are making those types of investments, you had better be clear that you are
dealing with reputable people and that you understand the transaction or that you
have got a high enough premium to take that type of risk.
ROGERS: In the case of one of these private equity transactions where the
controlling shareholder has submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York court,
such as in the case of a share purchase or subscription agreement, if a suit is brought
in New York and a judgment is obtained based upon a misrepresentation in the
agreement, how can that judgment be made real as a remedy against the Mexican
controlling shareholder?
RITCH: Number one, as I understand, it would be a remedy granted under
contractual law and not under securities laws because we are talking about a private
placement. So, we would not apply the remedies granted under the Securities Act.
We would need to enforce it under New York contractual law and, if the Mexican
controlling shareholder has assets in the United States, we would use an order to

U.S.-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

seek a judgment and litigate directly in U.S. courts. If there are no assets in the
United States like bank accounts, equity interests or other real estate, we will have
to use regulatory letters to Mexico to litigate in the United States. Or, if there is a
process agent, we could try to seek the whole procedure in New York. Finally, once
there is a judgment in the United States, it would need to be enforced in Mexico
through diplomatic channels. There have been recent cases where I have
participated in international litigation where the Mexican government has
cooperated with the U.S. government to enforce such judgments.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/OWEN: My name is Mike Owen of Paul Hastings in
Los Angeles. First of all, in connection with the protection of minority shareholders
rights, Mexico actually has a vehicle that we do not have in the U.S., which is the
"comisario." I have always been kind of interested as to why minority shareholders
do not make more use of the comisarioto protect their rights. As I understand it,
they have a lot of power and the cost of the coinisariosand the investigations by the
comisarioshave to be born by the company.
My second question is really for Francisco with respect to Cintra.6 You
mentioned various committees that have been set up and I wanted to zero in on the
audit committee: Is your audit committee made up entirely of independent directors
and, secondly, does the internal auditor of the company report to the auditing
committee of the board of trustee rather than to the CEO?
CARILLO: In the case of Cintra, the audit committee is composed totally by
independent directors. The audit committee has to review, among other things, the
compliance to the code and to the other self-regulatory rules that Cintra issued. The
audit committee also reviews the financial statements that go to the Mexican stock
exchange on a quarterly basis. Also, the audit committee reviews any particular
requests made by the inspector, by the comisario, regarding self-interest dealing,
duty of care, duty of loyalty and compliance with disclosure liabilities. The internal
controller reports directly to the audit committee.
Now, your first question is a very interesting one with respect to the comisario.
The comisario in Mexico actually is the individual, not the auditor, but an
accountant, normally, that represents the financial interest of the shareholders. The
comisariohas broad rights under Mexican law. It has the right to call shareholders'
meetings. It has the right to request that the financial statements be prepared in
accordance with the financial accounting and principles. It even has the right to
object to the financial statements. It also has certain rights such as the ability to
propose to the shareholders the imposition of liability on the shareholders, subject
to the directors, and subject to shareholders' votes. The comisariocan even call a
shareholders' meeting and go to a shareholders' meeting and propose that a vote on
liability be brought to the directors. The reason that it has not been enforced is that,

6. Corporaci6n lnternacional de Aviaci6n, S.A. de C.V. Cintra was incorporated at the initiative of
creditor banks in order to put Aeromtxico and Mexicana's finances back on sound footing. Following the
acquisition, Cintra would strictly be a holding company, registered with the Mexican Stock Exchange. The
corporate purpose of Cintra, in addition to solving the two airlines financial problems, involved acting as a common
ground between both companies' shareholders and creditors and promoting the injection of fresh resources into
the airfines. The Annual Economic Competition Report 1995.1996 (Report 11/1996 The Federal Competition
Commission).
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normally, the comisario is a partner of the auditing firm. The auditing firm is,
obviously, very close to the closely held corporation of the controlling shareholders.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do the minority shareholders have the right to
appoint their own comisario?
CARILLO: Yes, to the extent that there are three or more comisario.
ROGERS: You mean three or more shareholders?
CARILLO: No. If the company is going only to have comisarioby shareholder
resolution, they do not have minority rights. Minority rights must provided for in
the bylaws, and state that the minority shareholders will have the same rights to
appoint comisario,or cast votes in shareholders' meetings and state that there will
be three comisario. Therefore, the minority shareholders will have the right to
appoint one comisario if they have 10% of the equity if it is a listed company, or
25% of the equity otherwise.
LUBRANO: In the context of the comisario, this concept is not unique to
Mexico. They are a civil law/company law element that is sometimes called
sindicos in Mexico and consejosfiscais in Brazil. The Latin America roundtable
has reviewed the experience. The experience across both Europe and Latin
America is dismal. The principle reasons are that those who appoint the members
are usually the controlling shareholders, and the comisariosreceive no resources to
do their job. The last reason is that it creates a conflict with the real controllers and
they can just refuse to give the correct information or lie to them. What is occurring
in the region, with the exception of Brazil for special reasons, is a movement away
from these independent organs and a movement towards true audit committees
composed of directors. These are real directors of the company who sit on the
board as a whole. They have access to the company's information, they cannot
have a completely conflicting relationship with the rest of the board, and they have
the resources. This is the movement that is beginning. Some countries, like Chile,
abolished these things twenty to thirty years ago.
Brazil is the one exception because most of the outstanding shares of the
Brazilian companies are non-voting, so they cannot appoint anybody to the board.
They are using the consejofiscal,which is the fiscal board. This is usually a threeperson body used as a way to permit the non-voting shareholders to appoint, so that
they can have a voice or some oversight capacity. However, experience
demonstrates that this is not the future. The future is real audit committees
composed of independent members of the board.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/PATTERON: My name is Mike Patterson from
Strausberger & Price, Mexico City. I have three questions. The first one is, perhaps,
for Miguel Jduregui. In the U.S., there have been insider-trading laws for some
time. However, supporting those laws, we also have the schedule 13 reporting of
insiders, and forms 3, 4 and 5 in the market. On the Internet, there is information
regarding when directors have sold and bought their shares recently, and for how
much they sold and bought it. Hence, there is much information available. It
appears to be the kind of culture that supports enforcement against insider trading
and, also, devotes tremendous resources to enforcing those laws. The laws that are
on the books are going to be broken every day unless significant resources are
invested to enforce against it. How much enforcement has there been in the insider
area?
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JAUREGUI: Basically, very few resources have been dedicated to that. As far
as I am concerned, there are really no standards of investigation according to the
authorities regulating this at the National Securities, Banking and Securities
Commission. Moreover, you have to remember that the origin of the capital needs
of Mexico was families that wanted to go transnational. It grew from families that
wanted to expand their companies and went to the public markets because they had
no other choice. But they did not go public happily. Therefore, the tradition really
has not been to evolve towards a more transparent system. Now, the transparency
has been mandated by the lack of liquidity in the market. This is why there has
been discussion about the code of best practices, auditing committees and
improving, generally, the manner with which insider trading will be dealt. As far
as I am concerned, subject to being corrected by my colleagues in Mexico, the
Article 16 of the Stock Market Law is more window dressing than it has been
substance. Moreover, we don't have a justice department that would go about
helping the Securities and Exchange Commission of Mexico, or the equivalent
thereof in the U.S., as it does in the U.S., which would help to understand the
movements and the consequences of the movements in violation of the law.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/PATTERSON: Have there been any enforcement
cases in this area?
JAUREGUI: Yes, there have been some cases that have kept themselves at the
non-disclosure level. However, some regulators take a friendly approach to
requesting that they disclose, which is where I have had some trouble.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The main problem is that we do not have
secondary regulations that define what insider information is, and we do not have
case law, as does the United States. Remember that the statute only says that the
protected information is material inside information. The only thing that Mexico
has regulated is relevant information. Nonetheless, relevant information is the
information that an issuer has to disclose immediately to the public.
Another issue is material, non-public information that is a basis for insider
trading. I concur with Miguel when he says that, in certain cases, the chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would call you, you would go with
legal counsel and discuss a matter, but there has not been, to our knowledge, any
enforcement of this. You can enforce insider-trading laws by bringing a civil action
in Mexico and the court would have to request the opinion of the Mexican CNBB.
ROGERS: Mr. Patterson, your second question, please?
AUDIENCE MEMBER/PATTERSON: What has been the history of cases in
the area of these 10-B-5 comfort letters for securities offerings in New York or
elsewhere in other foreign markets? I know a lot of times those letters are used to
share the liability in case a deal goes bad, to put the lawyers on the hook so to
speak. What has been the extent to which Mexican firms have been held liable or
sued for their opinions, and are those opinions and those cases subject to U.S. law
standards of the opinion or subject to a Mexican law standard, in terms of what the
attorney should have done in terms of due diligence? Additionally, are the firms
who are issuing those caring insurance packages a part of it?
HUNTINGTON: I can address a part of that question. I am not actually aware
of any action being brought against any Mexican law firm for this. The origin of
the comfort letter is that it allows the underwriter, principally the underwriter in the
transaction, to establish a due diligence defense in the event that an action has been
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brought on the basis of a material misstatement in the disclosure. Again, I am not
aware of an action being brought on the basis of a Mexican counsel's opinion in this
area. However, as an example, a case could be brought into the U.S. enforcement
system if someone were to bring an action against Goldman Sachs and Goldman
Sachs claims to have performed their due diligence. If they said that they have a
comfort letter from a lawyer in Mexico, but it turned out that nobody had ever heard
of the lawyer and he does not actually know what a 10-B-5 letter is, then that could
be grounds for failing on the due diligence defense.
In my experience, the firms that we deal with regularly in Mexico understand
what the letter means. U.S. lawyers take this extremely seriously. You read the
letter and it does not appear to say very much, but it is something law firms take
really quite seriously. Over the years, we have become comfortable with the
lawyers that we deal with in Mexico and know that they, as well as the
underwriters, also take the responsibility quite seriously.
RITCH: That is a very interesting issue, which is sometimes a point of tension
because U.S. lawyers will sometimes try to place the entire burden on the Mexican
lawyer. They may even request the Mexican lawyer to expressly mention in their
opinion the Securities Act of 1933 and to mention the magic language of no
material statement of omission, etcetera. It seems that they sometimes they want
the Mexican lawyer to do all the diligence, for instance. Most firms in Mexico have
all worried about this because they want, and have been able, to establish
responsibility very clearly. The language of those disclosure letters has been
refined over the years. It really has been a long effort with many hours devoted to
the letters, but with the intention of defining the role of Mexican counsel. They
have been trying to avoid being pinned under laws that they are not qualified to
practice under while insisting that the U.S. law firm is also under the obligation to
conduct its own independent due diligence review of the Mexican company. Of
course, we work together and coordinate our efforts, but it is a very delicate issue.
To our knowledge, there has never been natural enforcement action brought based
upon a Mexican legal opinion. Still, we do understand very well the risk, the
responsibilities and what it means so we are all careful about the assigning our role
very carefully and not taking on burdens that we are not supposed to take.
JAUREGUI: As a complement to what Jim was saying, one must keep two
things in mind. First, in many cases you can forget about the Securities Act. They
say that the documents as presented are enforceable pursuant to their terms.
However, it so happens that they have been drafted in New York by distinguished
law firms there and are based on New York practice, New York law and New York
experience, not all of which is specifically enforceable. Then you need to say
"specifically enforceable pursuant to its terms," which is where there was a
collision and a very serious sort of negotiation between, or among, lawyers from the
U.S. and Mexico in this particular case.
The second thing to keep in mind is that the Mexican lawyer is changing due to
the growing size of transactions that are now common in Mexico, and due to the due
diligence responsibility. I think that there is an exaggerated concern that letters of
opinion give us now because I believe that we have become very passive with the
attorneys in the U.S. in issuing them. I think that we need to start considering
carrying liability insurance because the risk without it is growing.
ROGERS: Richard, do you have a question?
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AUDIENCE MEMBER/KRUMBEIN: My name is Richard Krumbein, and I
am from Dorsey & Whitney. My question relates to disclosure. Earlier, we were
discussing the Mexican law on disclosure and the obligation that a company might
have, if any, to do a disclosure, especially a public company that is restructuring.
What happens when a Mexican public company begins to restructure some of the
subsidiaries in order to meet their bond obligations? What are the disclosure
requirements in that case? Secondly, are there any possibilities for challenges on
the underlying transaction if they do not disclose?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: From the U.S. side, there is a general rule of
disclosure that states that you must disclose events that are material. I suppose the
word in Mexico is "relevant," but if something happens that is material to the
business of the company, it must be disclosed to the market through a press release.
That press release must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. A
case of a restructuring where there are outstanding bonds might be something that
could trip up some of the covenants in the bonds.
Typically in a bond indenture, there will be an affirmative disclosure requirement
to the bondholder. They must be told about anything that is material, which
certairqly includes telling them about any default. The typical high yield covenant
package for a Mexican company, or other emerging market company, intends to
bind your hands in as many ways as possible in order to prevent restructuring or, at
least, to require consent. It is likely that you would have to disclose in this type of
case, too.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Additionally, under the Mexican system,
anything that is relevant must be disclosed. This can be compared to the United
States' requirement that anything that is material be disclosed. Both of these
requirements are quite broad. In Mexico, for example, the act of disclosing
something might affect the value of the securities. The management is then
required to make a judgment call as to whether to disclose it or not. If it is
something that is relevant and it is not disclosed, the Commission has the authority
to impose penalties and even to order the suspension its securities trading.
ROGERS: Our time has run out. Thank you very much to all of the speakers
and participants in this discussion.
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